Critical Infrastructure Protection Metrics and Tools; Techniques for Adversary Threat Probability Assessment [June 5-7, 2008] [video] by McGill, William
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Video Collection
2008-06-06
Critical Infrastructure Protection Metrics
and Tools; Techniques for Adversary
Threat Probability Assessment [June
5-7, 2008] [video]
McGill, William
Monterey, California:  Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34164
Techniques	  for	  Adversary	  Threat	  
Probability	  Assessment	  
William	  L.	  McGill	  
06	  June	  2008	  
First	  Principles⇒	   The	  Basic	  Model	  ⇒	   Some	  Examples	  ⇒	   Discussion	  
Basic	  DefiniAons	  
•  Risk	  is	  the	  poten9al	  for	  harm	  or	  loss	  
•  A	  hazard	  is	  a	  source	  of	  risk	  in	  general	  
•  A	  threat	  is	  a	  source	  of	  risk	  that	  is	  plausible	  
with	  respect	  to	  a	  DM’s	  specific	  circumstances	  
Risk = Threat ×  
                    Vulnerability ×   
                             Consequence 
RISK	  is	  the	  
COMBINATION	  of	  the	  













1. What	  are	  the	  plausible	  ini9a9ng	  events?	  
2. What	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  concern?	  
3. How	  likely	  is	  this	  combina9on	  of	  cause	  and	  consequence?	  
The	  Risk	  Triplet	  
The	  Basis	  of	  Risk	  
pij = Pr(ei,cj) = Pr(ei)Pr(cj|ei) 
Probability	  of	  Ini9a9ng	  Event	  
(threat	  probability)	  
Probability	  of	  Consequence	  cj	  given	  
Occurrence	  of	  Ini9a9ng	  Event	  ei	  
(vulnerability	  to	  cj	  from	  ei) 
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•  Probability	  that	  a	  hazardous	  
ini9a9ng	  event	  ei	  will	  occur:	  
– At	  a	  given	  loca9on?	  
– Of	  a	  given	  type?	  
– At	  a	  given	  9me?	  
Pr(ei)	  
	  




























• 	  Novel	  types	  (e.g.,	  RF)	  
• 	  Kine9c	  
• 	  Others…	  
All	  Possible	  Scenarios	  No	  Event	  Occurs	   A 	  Event	  Occurs	  
A	  NATURAL	  Event	  Occurs	  
An	  ANTHROPIC	  Event	  Occurs	  
Technologica







A	  Malicious	  AMack	  Occurs	  
A	  Malicious	  AMack	  
Occurs	  Against	  
Something	  the	  
Doesn’t	  MaMer	  to	  
Me	  
A	  Malicious	  AMack	  Occurs	  Against	  
Something	  the	  MaMers	  to	  Me	  
Explosive	  	   Sabotage	   Arson	  	  
Other	  	  ProjecAle	   CBRN	  
An	  Explosive	  AMack	  Occurs	  Against	  Something	  That	  MaMers	  to	  
Me	  
Stadium	   Office	  Building	   Power	  SubstaAon	  
Hospital	  Chemical	  Plant	  Train	  StaAon	  
P1	   P2	   AP3	  
P4	   P5	   P6	  
P7	   AP8	   P9	  
P10	   AP11	   P12	  
Scenarios	  and	  Surprise	  
“The	  unilateral	  advantage	  gained	  by	  the	  introduc4on	  of	  a	  new	  
weapon	  (or	  by	  the	  use	  of	  a	  known	  weapon	  in	  an	  innova4ve	  way)	  
in	  conflict	  against	  an	  adversary	  who	  is	  either	  unaware	  of	  its	  
existence	  or	  not	  ready	  with	  effec4ve	  countermeasures,	  the	  
development	  of	  which	  requires	  4me.”	  
Adapted	  from:	  
Cynthia	  Grabo,	  An4cipa4ng	  Surprise:	  Analysis	  for	  Strategic	  Warning	  
•  Knowledge	  of	  plausible	  alternaAve	  scenarios	  is	  an	  
essenAal	  element	  of	  defeaAng	  surprise	  
•  In	  general,	  the	  scenario	  idenAficaAon	  is	  the	  most	  













































Explosive – Rail Car


































































































On Person – Via Back 
Road
Ground Vehicle (A) – 
Via Back Road
On Person – Via Main 
Access Road
Ground Vehicle (H) – 
Via Main Access Road
Ground Vehicle (A) – 
Via Main Access Road
On Person – Via 
Forest
On Person – Via 
Water
Waterborne Vehicle 
(H) – Via Water
Waterborne Vehicle 
(A) – Via Water
Aerial Vehicle (H) – 
Via Air
Relevant Attack Profiles for Explosive – HAZMAT Scenario
Aerial Vehicle (A) – 
Via Air
Ground Vehicle (H) – 
Via Back Road
Threat scenarios are 
defined as the pairing 
of threat type to a 
susceptible critical 
element via a target 
suscpetibility matrix
Attack profiles are 
defined as the pairing 
of threat delivery 
systems to compatible 
intrusion paths via an 
attack profile 
compatibility matrix
The set of threat 
scenarios consists of 
all possible threat 
scenario - susceptible 
critical element pairs
The set of attack 
profiles consists of all 
representative delivery 
















•  The	  probability	  of	  realizing	  an	  aaack	  profile	  




•  AP	  =	  Rela9ve	  aaack	  profile	  aarac9veness	  
•  AS	  =	  Rela9ve	  scenario	  aarac9veness	  
•  AA	  =	  Rela9ve	  asset	  aarac9veness	  
•  	  λ0	  =	  Baseline	  threat	  rate	  of	  occurrence	  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )AASASPP Pr|Pr,|PrPr =









( )( )0,1max ***** CPLPGU SSP −−−=Generic	  Profile	  
U9lity:	  
























•  Perfect	  Knowledge:	  The	  adversary	  has	  perfect	  
knowledge	  of	  everything	  
•  Zero-­‐sum	  game:	  the	  adversary’s	  gain	  exactly	  
balances	  the	  defender’s	  loss	  
Prototypical	  Adversaries	  
•  The	  “ra9onal”	  adversary	  
	  
•  The	  “gain	  maximizer”	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Thank	  you	  for	  your	  @me!	  
